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The UK, Interrogation and Iraq, 2003-8 
Dr Samantha Newbery 
 
 
Intelligence relating to Iraq has been the subject of official and press scrutiny since the US 
and the UK began preparing for the 2003 invasion.  The publication of the UK Joint 
Intelligence Committee’s paper on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in September 
2002 was the first aspect to be given this attention.
1
  This interest peaked again when the 
UK’s Butler Inquiry into intelligence on WMD was commissioned and reported in 2004.2  In 
the same year the use of interrogation as a method of collecting intelligence in Iraq began to 
receive attention when pictures of prisoners being abused at the US military prison at Abu 
Ghraib were published.
3
  The UK’s own public record of interrogation in Iraq has also been 
tarnished, not least by the death of Baha Mousa, a detainee who died whilst being held for 
questioning at the Temporary Detention Facility in Basra in September 2003.  A video 
showing Baha Mousa and his fellow detainees handcuffed, hooded with sandbags, forced to 
stand in painful positions and being verbally abused was broadcast on the TV news.
 
 The use 
of hooding and ‘stress positions’ proved particularly controversial as the video demonstrated 
that the 1972 ban on these techniques had either been forgotten or ignored.
4
  Yet not all 
interrogations carried out by the UK in Iraq during combat operations there were as 
aggressive as those seen in this video. 
 British forces used interrogation extensively after the March 2003 invasion.  They 
continued to do so – apart from a period in 2005-6 – until December 2008, four months 
before the end of UK combat operations there.  Interrogation can be a valuable source of 
intelligence in conflict, but has proved controversial.  In addition to the Baha Mousa case 
outlined above, High Court proceedings drew attention to the interrogation practices the UK 
employed in Iraq.  In November 2010 it was reported that High Court proceedings had been 
brought on behalf of 222 former detainees who alleged they were mistreated by the UK 
military’s Joint Forward Interrogation Team (JFIT).  Amongst the allegations were claims 
that detainees had been hooded and subjected to electric shocks, sound deprivation by use of 
ear muffs, sleep deprivation and sight deprivation.
5
  The Court was given two videos showing 
the JFIT interrogate a suspected insurgent.  They show the interrogator seeking a confession 
by swearing and using insults, threats and intimidation.
6
  Evidence suggests that over 2,500 
recordings of the JFIT’s interrogations were made.7  It has been commented that ‘[t]here is 
reason to believe … [the videos] show other JFIT detainees being treated in a similar manner’ 
but that ‘[n]ot all the videos show scenes of abuse.’8 
The treatment of Iraqi prisoners became the subject of public attention once again 
when more than 140 Iraqis, including some who had been held in the JFIT’s custody, brought 
a case to the Court of Appeal.
9
  The Court ruled in November 2011 that the Iraq Historical 
Allegations Team (IHAT), set up ‘to investigate the allegations of abuse of Iraqi citizens by 
British service personnel’, was not sufficiently independent because it included members of 
the Royal Military Police, an organisation that had been involved in detention in Iraq.
10
  The 
High Court then investigated the reconstituted IHAT, ruling in May 2013 that it was 
sufficiently independent.
11
 
The conflict’s growing unpopularity may have encouraged false allegations of 
mistreatment to be made against British forces and heightened the British public and media’s 
interest, and even belief, in such allegations.  It was claimed, for instance, that some of the 
dead collected after the Battle of Danny Boy in May 2004 had been taken alive and then 
unlawfully killed by British troops before being returned to locals.  These serious allegations 
have been found to be untrue.
12
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 The kind of treatment alleged to have taken place during the JFIT’s interrogations and 
seen in the two videos that were made public remains, and always will remain, deplorable.  
Many of the Ministry of Defence’s compensation awards to Iraqis detained during combat 
operations relate to the JFIT.
13
  But it should not be assumed that the JFIT always used such 
aggressive techniques.  A small handful of monographs published since 2012 address British 
interrogation practices in Iraq.
14
  Material collected by the Al Sweady Inquiry of 2009-14 into 
allegations made against British soldiers in connection with events of 2004 and a focus on the 
JFIT’s  work provides the opportunity to identify and evaluate the British military’s 
interrogation operations in Iraq in more depth and breadth than has been attempted to date. 
 The Inquiry was commissioned in 2009 to investigate ‘allegations made by the 
Claimants in the Al Sweady Judicial Review proceedings’.15  British soldiers had been 
ambushed by insurgents on 14 May 2004 at the ‘Danny Boy’ vehicle check point around five 
kilometres north-east of the town of Al Majar al’Kabir, Maysan province, and a battle 
ensued.  The allegations that followed included that Iraqi nationals had been taken into 
custody after the battle and unlawfully killed.  As mentioned above, the Al Sweady Inquiry 
dismissed these allegations.  It was also claimed that certain individuals detained in the 
aftermath of the Battle of Danny Boy, as it became known, were ill-treated during their 
subsequent detention at the Camp Abu Naji British military base and the Shaibah Logistics 
Base.
16
  Allegations concerning their time at Camp Abu Naji included that they were strip 
searched in a way that was intended to humiliate or to prepare them for questioning, that a 
tent peg was banged on a table with the intention of scaring them and that they were shouted 
at during questioning.  These allegations were upheld by the Inquiry.  In a particularly 
sensational group of allegations detainees claimed they heard and saw indications that 
prisoners were being beaten, tortured and executed at the camp.  The Inquiry found these to 
be deliberate lies.
17
  Claims that they heard recordings of torture upon arrival at the Shaibah 
Logistics Base were also found to be deliberate lies and various of their allegations 
concerning questioning at the JFIT compound were judged to have been fabricated.
18
  
Evidence on interrogation made public by the press and by the Inquiry into Baha Mousa’s 
death understandably tends to be skewed towards controversial treatment.  But the Al Sweady 
Inquiry material shows that the interrogation of the detainees captured at Danny Boy was not 
as contentious as had been alleged. 
 By focusing on the practice of interrogation rather than allegations of mistreatment 
connected with it this article contests the accuracy of the common portrayal of interrogation 
in the ‘War on Terror’ as relying on torture.  The first part of the article identifies the nature 
of the UK’s involvement in interrogation in Iraq between 2003 and 2008, expanding 
understanding of this widespread practice.  It will show that of the UK’s security and 
intelligence organisations it was the military who were most involved.  It will then evaluate 
Britain’s interrogation operations in Iraq, specifically those conducted by the JFIT, and, 
therefore, Britain’s interrogation capability.  Some success in collecting intelligence was had.  
Interrogation’s effectiveness was constrained, however, by a shortage of trained interrogators 
and interpreters, limitations in the interpreters’ skill levels, the availability of written 
materials and analytic support, and weaknesses in written guidance.  It will be argued that to 
a large extent these constraints stemmed from insufficient preparations.  This could have been 
partially avoided by maintaining permanent, higher levels of preparedness.  Restrictions on 
resources may affect the chances of establishing and maintaining these capabilities. 
 Given that intelligence influenced coalition policies and the military’s actions, and 
that this in turn affected the Iraqi people’s opinion of the coalition, the UK and its armed 
forces, intelligence in Iraq deserves greater study.  As a particularly controversial method of 
collecting intelligence, and one that has received much public scrutiny, interrogation is an 
aspect of intelligence that is particularly worthy of further research.  This is made even more 
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true by the rise of the self-styled ‘Islamic State’ in Iraq and Syria that has once again put the 
possibility of military intervention in the region on the British government’s agenda.  Indeed, 
British military training teams have already been sent and air strikes carried out.  Increased 
involvement may once again mean involvement in interrogation.  Identifying lessons from 
past operations can help inform any future operations. 
 
The nature of Britain’s involvement in interrogation in Iraq 
Many of the UK’s security and intelligence organisations were involved with interrogation in 
Iraq.  The armed forces, Security Service (MI5) and Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) all 
conducted interrogations after the 2003 invasion.
19
  GCHQ – the UK’s signals intelligence 
organisation – was involved in at least two instances.  In one, an employee took notes and 
provided ‘guidance to the interrogators on questions to ask and the veracity of the answers 
given.’20  Support was provided to the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) by SIS and the Ministry of 
Defence’s civilian Defence Intelligence Staff.21  Active from June 2003 until September 
2004, the ISG was staffed by US, UK and Australian personnel who conducted interrogations 
and debriefings, including that of Saddam Hussein, and analysed millions of pages of 
documents to produce ‘a unique perspective on the intentions, policies, programs, and 
mechanisms of the former Regime’s WMD programs and international policy.’22  
International cooperation on intelligence went beyond the ISG’s work.  For instance, in 2003 
SIS officers questioned a detainee held at a US facility, and three members of military 
intelligence stationed at Abu Ghraib prison between January and April 2004 interrogated 
prisoners there.
23
 
 Of all these UK agencies it was the armed forces who were most extensively involved 
in interrogation.  The military uses the term ‘interrogation’ to refer to four types of 
questioning, one of which is also called interrogation in a narrower sense of the term.  
Processing is the questioning of prisoners upon their arrival at a detention facility to confirm 
their identity.
24
  The further questioning of those who are willing to share their knowledge is 
known as debriefing.
25
  Notes from an interrogation training course delivered to members of 
the armed forces states that ideally debriefing should be carried out by trained debriefers but 
that ‘should the tactical situation require it’ it can be conducted by unit tactical questioners.26  
Of the members of the JFIT active in May 2004, the two who were trained debriefers were 
reservists.
27
  Detainees who are unwilling to share the information they possess are subject 
first to tactical questioning, which takes place in the hours after capture and seeks intelligence 
‘the value of which would deteriorate or be lost altogether if the questioning was delayed 
until a trained interrogator could be made available’.  Tactical questioning was to be carried 
out by trained members of the capturing unit.
28
  Neither of the two tactical questioners active 
at the Temporary Detention Facility in Basra while Baha Mousa was held there were full-
time tactical questioners and this was likely to have been the case elsewhere in the British 
Army.
29
  Interrogation, in the narrow sense of the term, sometimes follows and consists of 
‘systematic questioning … by a trained interrogator’.30  This article focuses on interrogation 
in this final, narrow sense as much of the questioning carried out by the British military was 
of this type and it is the type most strongly associated with mistreatment and the popular 
image of interrogation. 
 It was the Joint Forward Interrogation Team that was tasked with providing the 
British military’s main interrogation capability in Iraq.31  When the JFIT’s existence was 
publicised by the press in 2010, their compound was described as ‘shadowy’.32  They 
established and ran facilities ‘in the Basra area between March 2003 and December 2008.’33  
The JFIT’s Operations Officer deployed to Kuwait in mid-late February 2003, and was joined 
by two members of the Joint Services Intelligence Organisation’s (JSIO) training branch on 
28 February.
34
  The JSIO is based at the Defence Intelligence and Security Centre in 
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Chicksands, Bedfordshire, where intelligence training is delivered to the armed forces.  The 
rest of the JFIT deployed in mid-March.
35
  They crossed the Iraqi border together on 20 
March 2003, just a few hours after the invasion force, and set up a JFIT compound within the 
Temporary Internment Facility at Camp Bucca near Um Qasr, a port that serves Basra.
36
  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, there were inadequacies in the JFIT’s facilities at this early stage of 
the conflict.  They began operating not only before the compound had power or water, but 
before it had dedicated buildings, with prisoners ‘just held in the open’.37  The facilities, as 
far as there were any, could hold between ten and twenty-five prisoners, but held around sixty 
for a short period.
38
  By July 2003 the JFIT had moved into ‘a collection of rough tents’.  By 
January 2004 the facilities had been improved by a move ‘into prefabricated structures’.39 
 The Theatre Internment Facility was controlled by the US between April and 
September 2003.
40
  The UK maintained responsibility for the work of the JFIT at this time 
and the team handled only British prisoners.
41
  Given that the two states’ forces were working 
together as part of the coalition in Iraq it is not surprising that intelligence obtained by the 
JFIT in this period was shared with the US.
42
  But cooperation went further than this: 
although only methods of questioning routinely used by JFIT personnel were used at this 
time, these approaches were ‘considered jointly’.43  The US may have had interrogation 
experts at the Theatre Internment Facility whilst it was under their control, though it is not 
known where the impetus for their cooperation on interrogation approaches originated. 
 In December 2003 the JFIT relocated to the Divisional Temporary Detention Facility 
(DTDF) at the Shaibah Logistics Base, thirteen miles from Basra, where it remained until 
2007, though for reasons unknown it did not operate between April or May 2005 and 
November 2006.
44
  The Times has reported that hundreds of detainees passed through the 
JFIT’s Shaibah facility.45  The facilities were, once again, far from ideal.  There was no 
sound-proofing, for instance.
46
  To comply with the requirement set out in the JFIT’s 
Operational Directive that detainees be prevented from corroborating cover stories, detainees 
were therefore kept in single-occupancy cells whenever possible.
47
 
The JFIT’s final year in Iraq was spent at Basra Airport.48  Their departure in 
December 2008 was linked to the expiration of the UN mandate that allowed the UK military 
to remain in Iraq.  Coalition forces were allowed to remain in Iraq longer, with the permission 
of the Iraqi government.
49
  Accordingly, UK combat operations in Iraq continued, formally 
ending on 30 April 2009.
50
  Now that these features of Britain’s involvement in interrogation 
in Iraq have been identified the nature of the JFIT’s work can be explored and evaluated in 
more detail. 
 
Evaluating British interrogation in Iraq 
The JFIT’s performance can be evaluated by focusing on the specifics of one interrogation 
operation.  Comments on the JFIT’s wider interrogation capability can, and will, also be 
made wherever sources allow.  The Al Sweady Inquiry investigated allegations made by nine 
Iraqis arrested in the aftermath of the Battle of Danny Boy in connection with their time in 
detention between 15 and 24 May 2004.
51
  Amongst the allegations relating to their time at 
the JFIT compound are claims that the military guards, who were not members of the JFIT, 
deprived them of sleep by banging on cell doors, shouting and playing music, that they 
lacked exercise provision and access to a lavatory, that requests for medical assistance were 
refused and that they could hear screaming, which they realised was a tape recording.
52
  One 
detainee has since described how ‘[i]n the cells we were all calling out to each other our 
names and our families’ details, in case one of us died [so that] our families could be told.’53  
The International Committee of the Red Cross visited these detainees in the JFIT compound 
and concluded that three of them had injuries consistent with allegations of manhandling at 
the point of arrest.
54
  In the words of Lieutenant Colonel David Wakefield, the Commander 
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Legal, ‘[t]he ICRC was at pains to emphasise that they had no suspicion whatsoever that any 
abuse had happened at the DTDF [at the Shaibah Logistics Base, within which the JFIT was 
based] and that any injuries the internees had they had arrived with.’55  The Al Sweady 
Inquiry dismissed many allegations completely.  As a result of investigating others, chiefly 
including the deprivation of sleep and lack of access to a lavatory, the Inquiry admitted that 
some aspects of the conditions and the detainees’ treatment were unsatisfactory but that this 
was unintentional.
56
 
 After being detained in the aftermath of the Battle of Danny Boy these men were 
taken to Camp Abu Naji for processing.
57
  They went through tactical questioning there 
before being taken by helicopter to the JFIT compound at Shaibah for more detailed 
interrogation.
58
  A detainee who had a gunshot wound spent one night at Shaibah before 
being transferred to a hospital, five detainees were kept there for six days, and the remainder 
for seven days.
59
  Using the Al Sweady Inquiry’s material it is possible to identify and assess 
the JFIT’s interrogation capability, how well prepared and resourced they were, and their 
level of success. 
 The JFIT’s mission was to extract information and intelligence from selected 
prisoners in a ‘timely and systematic’ fashion.60  Tactical questioning of the Danny Boy 
detainees aimed to establish whether they should be further questioned, passed to the Iraqi 
police or released.  The tactical questioning report for one detainee stated he ‘[k]nows more 
than he is letting on, [interrogation by the] JFIT is recommended.’61  Interrogation was 
believed to be a potentially good source of vital, urgently needed intelligence.  The Officer 
Commanding the JFIT at this time told the Inquiry 
I have to absolutely make this clear: we were under a massive pressure from the 
whole of the Brigade to extract information or intelligence that potentially could be a 
secondary attack, there could be weapons out there that were about to be used on an 
attack tomorrow, next hour, next minute.
62
 
In early 2004 the Priority Intelligence Requirements for the JFIT – and for personnel across 
the South-East of Iraq – were the military threat to coalition forces, the civil situation in 
Basra and Former Regime elements.  They were also issued with requirements that were not 
priorities, namely organisations, leading personalities, ‘[f]unding and procurement of 
groups’, ‘[r]ecruitment and reward of terrorists and militia’, and views on the coalition forces.  
The JFIT were also issued Specific Requests for Information, which gave them questions to 
pose to particular prisoners.
63
  The JFIT had some degree of success in fulfilling these aims 
when interrogating the Danny Boy detainees. 
 So as to make the best use of resources, interrogators were matched to detainees.  The 
detainees expected to possess more intelligence, as established by the JFIT’s Operations 
Officer on the basis of all available information on the detainee, would be allocated the most 
skilled interrogators.
64
  When planning their interrogations, interrogators could benefit from 
access to a range of resources.  The JFIT’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), for 
example, stated they were to be supported by an intelligence team, who could be telephoned 
to check names and dates.
65
  Written materials included, where available, the target pack 
drawn up in advance of a planned arrest operation, tactical questioning reports for the 
detainees, capture reports and the detainee’s personal belongings.66  Interrogators use these 
resources to form a preliminary opinion on what information the detainees possess and which 
interrogation approaches are likely to be most effective.  In practice, interrogators did not 
always have access to all of the resources they might have benefited from.  They did not 
always receive written materials promptly, either: sometimes it was emailed straight away 
and at others it arrived by email two to three days after the detainees’ arrival.67  Such delays 
can cause interrogations to be postponed or hinder the interrogators’ preparations, thereby 
delaying or preventing the collection of intelligence that the JFIT was under pressure to 
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collect.  That these delays were able to happen frequently suggests that there was either a lack 
of procedure for passing this material on to interrogators or that there were factors such as 
high workloads that were preventing procedures from being followed. 
 Detainees were asked direct questions in accordance with authorised interrogation 
approaches listed in the Standard Operating Procedure for JFIT interrogators.
68
  Four such 
approaches were available to interrogators.  In the ‘neutral’ approach they were expected to 
‘[b]e bland’ and treat the interrogation like an administrative process.69  Guidance on the 
‘friendly’ approach instructed interrogators to appear interested, attentive and ‘on the 
prisoner’s side.’70  The ‘firm’ approach involved acting like the ‘firm but fair Headmaster or 
Sergeant Major.’71  In the words of a JFIT interrogator, the attitude of interrogators using this 
approach was, ‘I’m not going to be here as your best mate, let’s get this over and done with 
as quickly and painlessly as possible’.72 
 The final authorised approach – the ‘harsh’ approach – has proved most controversial.  
It is sarcastic, cynical, loud or vicious.
73
  It can be seen in use in a video recording of a JFIT 
interrogation.
74
  Although the JFIT’s Operational Directive of May 2004 stated this approach 
was permissible, it also noted that experience gained in Iraq to date showed that the harsh 
approach ‘merely shuts the … [prisoner] up further.’75  The Directive goes on to note that the 
harsh and firm approaches could still be useful, but only ‘to close down a subject and control 
… [a prisoner’s] waffling or deflection.’76  The harsh approach was the subject of public 
attention in 2011 when the Baha Mousa Inquiry recommended it be forbidden for tactical 
questioning.
77
  Responding to this recommendation, the Ministry of Defence defended its 
continued support of the approach, arguing that it was necessary in order ‘to secure swiftly … 
the intelligence that can save lives.’78  Nonetheless, legal challenges saw the approach 
replaced with the more restrictive ‘challenge direct’ in 2012.79 
 The Danny Boy detainees were exposed to neutral, firm and, in one case, ‘firm to 
strong’ approaches.80  Six of them alleged that they were shouted at and questioned 
aggressively and angrily, and two further alleged that they were threatened during 
interrogation.
81
  One told the Al Sweady Inquiry that he was physically pushed around, that 
the interrogator yelled constantly and that he eventually made a false admission to stop the 
interrogator’s accusations.82  These detainees had previously suffered ill-treatment and 
‘threatening and oppressive tactical questioning’ at Camp Abu Naji, which gave them an 
incentive to try to end the JFIT’s interrogations quickly by telling the interrogators what they 
wanted to hear.
83
  The Al Sweady Inquiry rejected the allegations that they were shouted at 
and questioned aggressively during the JFIT’s interrogations, concluding that these claims 
were lies and exaggerations.
84
  Their interrogations, although uncomfortable, were not as 
extreme as the commonly-held conception of interrogation in the ‘War on Terror’.  The 
alleged and actual extreme practices used in connection with interrogation in the ‘War on 
Terror’ have received much media attention.  Given their seriousness, this is right: pressure 
should arguably be placed on governments to investigate allegations of mistreatment, 
ascertain the truth and take action to prevent reoccurrences of unjustified and illegal 
practices.  However, findings that allegations are untrue are often deemed less newsworthy 
than the original allegations, leaving the public with an inaccurate picture of the treatment of 
detainees held for interrogation. 
 The number of personnel in the JFIT, their training and skills affected their 
effectiveness as collectors of intelligence.  Over the course of its existence the JFIT had 124 
interrogators.
85
  The JFIT’s first Officer Commanding (OC) wrote that some of the team met 
for the first time only the day before their deployment and that the JFIT was ‘untrained and 
unexercised in its war role’.86  In May 2004 the team consisted of an OC, a Second in 
Command and Operations Officer (a role jointly held by one individual), interrogators, 
debriefers, interpreters and a collator.
87
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 The collator supported interrogation by cross-referencing interrogation reports to 
check for ‘holes’ in the stories they contained or further lines of enquiry and was responsible 
for the secure storage of information at the JFIT compound.
88
  Along with the Operations 
Officer the collator analysed information gained during interrogation and fed this back to 
interrogators for use in further sessions.
89
  The JFIT had some success in passing relevant 
information gained in a particular interrogation to other interrogators working with the same 
group of detainees.
90
 
 For the collator to perform their duties at the highest possible standard it was desirable 
that they were experienced not just in collation but in intelligence analysis as well.
91
  It is not 
known to what extent this was realised in practice.  The JFIT’s Operational Directive added 
that ‘[i]deally, analyst support should be available from J2X [an intelligence team] but 
unfortunately they are neither staffed adequately nor close enough to the JFIT [compound] to 
give this support effectively.’92  Once more, the availability of resources was not optimal. 
 The team active in May 2004 was recruited from the Army, the Navy and the RAF.
93
  
When the Danny Boy detainees were held at the JFIT compound all the interrogators were 
reservists.
94
  This was not unique: when the JFIT first deployed to Iraq all its members were 
reservists except for the OC and the Second in Command.
95
  In May 2004 the JFIT had less 
than the full-complement of trained interrogators.
96
  The OC has since said they were short of 
people, short of people trained in interrogation and that they also would have benefited from 
a reach-back capability where documents found with the individuals – whether it be 
phones, or paper, pocket litter – be exploited back in the UK, and forensic capabilities 
so that we could then go through a more systematic and detailed form of 
interrogation.
97
 
These limitations might have led to acts of desperation by the team.  But instead, in the OC’s 
words, it led to demoralisation and a feeling of defeat.
98
  Limitations in the armed forces’ 
level of preparedness for interrogation, specifically in sufficient numbers of trained 
interrogators and in analytical support for interrogation, highlight the need to consider how to 
maintain a higher level of preparedness in future. 
 Although some detainees could speak English,
99
 interpreters were crucial members of 
the JFIT.  Without them little would have been achieved.  The JFIT’s first OC argued that 
without ‘a one-to-one ratio of interrogators to interpreters, the interrogators can not be fully 
utilised.’100  The first JFIT deployed without sufficient linguists, and the team that deployed 
in July 2003 had only one interpreter for five interrogators, meaning the interrogation of 
detainees who needed an interpreter would have to wait until the interpreter was available, 
despite the readiness of the interrogators.
101
  A greater number of interpreters would have 
improved the UK’s interrogation capability, but training personnel in a variety of languages 
and dialects in anticipation of involvement in new conflicts is subject to considerable 
unavoidable limitations because of the amount of available resources.  Iraqis were used as 
interpreters for tactical questioning at the Temporary Detention Facility in Basra in the 
autumn of 2003, at least, but the intelligence sought during the JFIT’s interrogations was so 
sensitive that Iraqis were not permitted to interpret for them.
102
  Employing Iraqi interpreters 
was not without its own issues though: interpreters were among those who came under threat 
from anti-British militias and were subsequently relocated to Britain in 2008-9.
103
 
 As well as a shortage of interpreters, there were deficiencies in the language training 
and skill of some interpreters.  This had a negative impact on the JFIT’s work.  Frank 
Ledwidge, a former military intelligence officer who served in Iraq, persuasively argues that 
it is important not only to understand the words of detainees but to have cultural awareness in 
order to identify anything that is implicit in their words.
104
  This understanding takes at least 
three years to develop, Ledwidge suggests.
105
  The three interpreters who assisted in the 
Danny Boy detainee interrogations recall that more advanced language and interpreting skills 
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would have been of benefit.
106
  Their task was made more difficult by detainees’ accents and 
detainees themselves recall difficulty understanding the interpreters.
107
  There is no quick 
solution to the problem of imbuing interpreters with advanced skills in language and cultural 
awareness, suggesting there is a need to maintain permanent capabilities in a range of 
languages and cultures despite the resource implications. 
 The Operations Officer confirmed that when the standard of interpreters went down, 
operational effectiveness decreased.
108
  It is easy to argue that interpreters should have been 
better trained in Iraqi Arabic.  To what extent it is realistic to claim that this should have been 
the case at the time of the invasion of Iraq is open to debate.  How quickly interpreters should 
have been trained and deployed after this date depends not only on how quickly training can 
be delivered, but on the availability of suitable trainees and expectations around how many 
interpreters trained in Iraqi Arabic would be needed and for how long.  Efforts were certainly 
made to alleviate weaknesses.  Interrogators involved interpreters in their preparations so 
they could prepare the necessary vocabulary in advance.
109
  Further, interrogators were 
advised to keep their questions short and simple so as to aid the interpreters and to simplify 
the question in the event that an interpreter could not communicate it.
110
 
 The wording and completeness of written guidelines affect the training and practice 
that draw upon them.  Further, there have been times when practice has shown that the 
guidelines need to be amended.  The introduction of a new interrogation directive in 1972 
demonstrates this point: it replaced the 1965 version, that itself was amended in 1967 in 
response to the Bowen Inquiry into procedures relating to the arrest, interrogation and 
detention of terror suspects during the Aden Emergency.  The 1972 directive included the ban 
on certain interrogation techniques that had been used in Northern Ireland months earlier.  
This directive, and therefore the ban on these techniques, was still in force at the time of Baha 
Mousa’s questioning in Iraq, but had fallen from the Ministry of Defence’s corporate 
memory.
111
  While international conventions such as the Geneva Conventions and the 
European Convention on Human Rights apply to some interrogation operations, national 
military guidelines specific to interrogation can also apply. 
 The first JFIT Operational Directive was drawn up by the OC in May 2004 and 
‘codified the procedures that had been developed and put into practice prior to that date.’112  
A series of Standard Operating Procedures were included as annexes.  The Al Sweady 
Inquiry found that in places ‘the language used in the SOPs … [was] highly regrettable and 
wholly ill-conceived.  There … [was] a significant risk that the SOPs could have been 
interpreted by staff working in the JFIT as authorising conduct which contravenes provisions 
of international law’.113  There were also shortcomings in doctrine, with the first OC noting 
that there was no interrogation doctrine for the JFIT to use to base its practices on.
114
  But the 
team was also governed by Standard Operating Instruction 390 on the apprehending, 
handling and processing of prisoners, and international agreements relevant to the treatment 
of detainees, such as the United Nations Convention Against Torture.
115
  Further research is 
required before a more extensive assessment of the appropriateness of the guidelines 
governing the JFIT’s practices can be made. 
 Interrogation capability, and therefore intelligence-gathering capability, depends on 
the delivery of training that creates skilled personnel familiar with the relevant laws and 
guidelines.  The Al Sweady Inquiry judged that the JFIT’s effectiveness was impeded by the 
‘limited training that some members … had received.’116  In the late 1990s and early 2000s 
interrogation training consisted of a two-week course delivered at the Defence Intelligence 
and Security Centre.
117
  The two interrogators belonging to the JFIT in May 2004 had 
completed this course and had experience of conducting interrogations, albeit on exercise.
118
  
The other two staff questioning detainees were trained only in debriefing,
119
 in which the 
detainee is willing and cooperative,
120
 and neither had practiced debriefing before deploying 
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to Iraq.
121
  While it is desirable that interrogators, debriefers and tactical questioners are 
experienced, Britain’s military commitments, or the relative lack of them, may mean there is 
little to no opportunity to gain this experience.  Training compensates for this to some extent.  
Research into whether those trained and experienced in these practices are staying in the 
military for the long-term, and if not, why not, may be beneficial. 
The extent to which interrogation training in the lead up to and during combat 
operations in Iraq did or did not make clear which interrogation techniques were permissible 
has been discussed elsewhere.
122
  The complaints related to training concerning the JFIT were 
more general, citing insufficient numbers of trained interrogators.  As with the training of 
interpreters, we might ask why there were insufficient numbers of trained interrogators once 
the conflict in Iraq was underway and after the time when it might reasonably be expected 
that the military would have realised that the need for interrogators was going to continue.  
The government accepted the recommendations of the 2011 report into the death of Baha 
Mousa concerning improvements to training, including training in prisoner handling, 
interrogation and tactical questioning.
123
 
 The availability of suitable personnel, and of instructors, may help explain limitations 
in the number of trained interrogators.  Lieutenant Colonel Graham Le Fevre, a senior 
intelligence officer, commented in the autumn of 2003 that the UK military’s interrogation 
capability ‘is only held in the reserves and it has frankly languished for many years.  We need 
more and we need it now’.  He added, ‘[t]hat being said our problems pale into insignificance 
compared to the Americans who have only interrogated a small fraction of the people they 
have detained.’124  The UK was, therefore, not the only country with an interrogation 
capability that was less than ideal.  A variety of issues are raised by the situating of 
interrogation capability amongst reservists, chiefly the level of experience and how recently 
this experience was gained, though reservists remain a vital element of the UK’s security 
apparatus. 
 Asking what intelligence was gained from the Danny Boy detainees is one further, 
and valuable, way in which to assess the JFIT’s, and therefore the UK’s, interrogation 
capability in Iraq.  After each interrogation the JFIT’s interrogators prepared a report for 
dissemination.
125
  Most of the reports for the interrogations of the Danny Boy detainees are 
publicly available.  Despite being incomplete, these records give an indication of what 
intelligence the JFIT collected. 
 Basic information about the detainees’ employment and immediate family members 
was gained.  The interrogations tended to focus on the ambush of coalition forces that led to 
the detainees’ arrests, asking, for instance, whether they knew the other detainees arrested 
with them.
126
  Two of the detainees, at least, were asked about prominent personalities in Al 
Majar al’Kabir, a town whose population was ‘openly hostile’ to coalition forces.127  
Detainee Hussein Fadhil Abbas Al-Behadili provided information about the tribes in the area, 
including on a dispute between tribes, and about who worked in the local office of the Shiite 
political party Office of the Martyr Sadr.
128
  This detainee was one of three who were 
interrogated for a second time.  In his case it was judged that more information should be 
sought from him ‘on how the ambushes are being planned and conducted, who is controlling 
them’, the general threat, the Office of the Martyr Sadr, tribal disputes and personalities in the 
area.
129
  The information obtained from the resulting two and a half hours of interrogations 
filled around three and a half pages of the Interrogation Report and includes comments on 
how the level of unemployment in the area affected the relationship between Iraqis and 
coalition forces.
130
 
 This intelligence was potentially useful.  Exactly how useful it had the potential to be 
is difficult to judge without knowing how much intelligence of this sort was already in the 
UK’s possession.  The general effectiveness of the JFIT’s attempts to gain intelligence 
 10 
 
through interrogation can, however, be identified.  In an internal email dated September 
2003, Le Fevre told Lieutenant Colonel Edward Fenton, Chief of Staff to 19 Mechanised 
Brigade, that ‘[m]any of the people [interrogated by the JFIT] do not talk – our techniques are 
governed by the Geneva Convention and [are] clearly somewhat less “pointed” than those 
used by the previous [Iraqi] regime.’131  Yet there are indications that there was some 
cooperation from the Danny Boy detainees.
132
  Detainee Abbas Al-Hameedawi has since 
confirmed that he answered the interrogators’ questions truthfully.133  In contrast, another has 
claimed he said almost anything he could think of, ‘almost nonsense’, because he was so tired 
and wanted to keep talking until the interrogation was over.
134
  Another has said he withheld 
information as he ‘wanted the interrogation to come to an end and did not want’ to be asked 
more questions.
135
 
 The legal team representing 480 soldiers before the Al Sweady Inquiry suggested that 
evidence given by the detainees may be unreliable because it ‘is tainted by an anti-Western 
and anti-British bias’.136  Similarly, some of the detainees have contested the accuracy of the 
Interrogation Reports.
137
  Potential explanations for these differences of opinion are 
numerous.  These differences aside, the volume and type of intelligence in the Interrogation 
Reports has not been contested.  Yet useful intelligence will have no effect on decision-
making unless it is passed to decision-makers in a timely fashion and used.  It has been 
commented by a tactical questioner working in Iraq in late 2003 that in general very little 
intelligence was passed from the JFIT back to the soldiers who had arrested the detainees and 
the intelligence that was passed on was out of date.
138
  It is not known to what extent 
intelligence collected by the British military’s interrogators in Iraq was passed up the chain of 
command to their own decision-makers or to the British government. 
 
Conclusion 
Many of the details of the JFIT’s work during combat operations in Iraq remain secret.  This 
secrecy is likely to continue unless further allegations prompt legal, official or press 
investigations.  Generalising from the details that are known – whether they be those 
publicised by the press or those of the Danny Boy detainees’ interrogations – can lead to false 
impressions of this sometimes valuable method of collecting intelligence.  Yet understanding 
of British interrogation practices in Iraq is expanded by this examination of the case of the 
Danny Boy detainees. 
 It must be acknowledged that these detainees had a series of distressing experiences.  
They were ‘very frightened and confused’ when they arrived at Camp Abu Naji after being 
arrested on the battlefield after the Battle of Danny Boy.
139
  The ill-treatment the Al Sweady 
Inquiry found they were exposed to during tactical questioning at this camp included 
shouting and striking the table in a way that implied a threat of physical violence, and left 
them vulnerable.  That they arrived at the JFIT compound in a state of fear is evident from 
the reports of them calling their names to each other between their cells so their details could 
be passed to family members in the event of their deaths.  But many of the allegations 
concerning interrogation, including that they were shouted at, threatened and pushed, were 
rejected by the Al Sweady Inquiry.  The inquiry went so far as to judge that the treatment 
they received during interrogation at the JFIT compound was not ill-treatment.
140
 
 The treatment of other detainees interrogated by the JFIT reported by the press falls 
further along the spectrum of controversial treatment.  These detainees allege their treatment 
included electric shocks and hooding, and videos show the use of highly intimidating 
behaviour during interrogation.  Most of the interrogations of the Danny Boy detainees used 
the neutral or firm approaches, not the apparent use of the harsh technique seen in the public 
videos of the JFIT’s interrogations.  Details of the Danny Boy interrogation operation expand 
the still somewhat patchy knowledge of the JFIT’s work in Iraq and therefore expands 
 11 
 
knowledge of the UK’s interrogation capability and practices, and of the UK’s activities in 
Iraq more widely. 
 Through the Al Sweady Inquiry’s investigations much is now known about not only 
the JFIT’s interrogation approaches, but wider aspects of their role in Iraq.  They entered the 
country hours after the main invasion force, showing that interrogation was a planned part of 
the war and suggesting that it was hoped, or expected, that it would prove a valuable source 
of intelligence.  They were under pressure to produce intelligence in line with the priorities 
and requirements issued to personnel in the South-East of Iraq, chiefly on the military and 
civil situation in the region, details of a variety of organisations and public opinion.  Their 
efforts were supported by practices that included matching interrogators to detainees and 
access to written materials such as capture reports and tactical questioning reports.  Although 
they had a collator, the team would have benefited from greater analytical support to establish 
the reliability and accuracy of intelligence obtained in interrogation and to exploit documents 
captured with the detainees, then to combine this with intelligence from other sources to 
create reports that could be disseminated to decision-makers. 
 The JFIT’s effectiveness was also hampered by deficiencies in their facilities, even at 
Shaibah where they operated for around two years in total.  There was also a shortage of 
skilled, experienced interpreters and interrogators, at times at least.  This may be partially 
explained by the limited preparations by coalition forces for what became a descent into 
insurgency and lawlessness after the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime in April 2003.  
Other possible explanations include the UK’s relatively limited involvement in conflicts in 
the years before 2003 and resource restrictions.  The extent to which observers can 
reasonably comment that these limitations should not have been present at the time of the 
invasion of Iraq is open to debate.  Nonetheless, higher levels of preparedness for 
interrogation could have provided more trained interrogators, interpreters and analytical 
support, making interrogation a more effective intelligence-gathering tool.  Despite these 
weaknesses, the cooperation of the Danny Boy detainees was achieved.  When enough 
interrogations are conducted success can accumulate to the extent that this becomes a 
particularly valuable source of intelligence.   
 Interrogation personnel benefit when decision-makers, the press and the public have 
realistic expectations about what they can achieve.  Imposing impossible targets upon these 
personnel can lower morale, leading to feelings of desperation that in turn can lead to 
unacceptable treatment of prisoners.  More realistic expectations can flow from accurate 
understanding of interrogation practices and of the challenges facing interrogation teams, 
though this is necessarily limited by official secrecy. 
 This examination of the interrogation of the Danny Boy detainees has expanded 
knowledge of the JFIT’s  role in Iraq, and therefore of the UK’s involvement in interrogation 
between the March 2003 invasion and the JFIT’s withdrawal in December 2008.  This is one 
of many of the secretive interrogation operations that have been used extensively by western 
states in the ‘War on Terror’.  Knowledge may expand further if new allegations concerning 
British interrogation practices in Iraq are made.  A question that may remain difficult to 
answer is to what extent the variety of practices we are aware of are typical of British 
interrogation practices during combat operations in Iraq.  While public knowledge of 
interrogation practices can damage their effectiveness by forewarning the targets of what to 
expect after capture, investigations of allegations can benefit the complainants, the accused 
and future detainees.  Allegations can receive much publicity, while the findings of 
investigations into which are true and which are not can receive less.  The informal oversight 
of these practices that comes from press coverage of the allegations and the findings of 
official investigations can be an important part of the workings of a democratic state.  But a 
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balance must be struck, and a compromise made, between educating the public about secret 
practices whilst protecting that secrecy. 
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